rative of the Reformation as an agent of secularization: by placing so much pressure on the category of belief, reformers turned articles of faith into objects of critical reflection, thereby (through a torturous, bloody, and still unfinished historical process) creating the conditions for the emergence of a secular space of toleration in which religious differences, among other things, could be discussed. 5 It's a narrative that reiterates the contrasts drawn by reformers themselves between the merely implicit faith required by Rome and the exercise of reason required for a "waking, working" faith -or, to use the rhetoric of early defenders of the secular sphere, between medieval superstition and modern enlightenment. Contemporary academia's disdain for Whiggery notwithstanding, this triumphalist narrative continues to provide the template for the stories we tell about "traditional religion" and its modern transformations. 6 The difference (and it isn't a minor one) is that in recent iterations the triumphalism has been muted or inverted altogether. Now that an all but exhausted tradition of reductionist critique has been officially deauthorized by the "religious turn," scholars plume themselves on their commitment to taking belief seriously as an irreducible feature of human experience. But it's worth asking whether the best way to take belief seriously is to treat it as a given: an object beyond, or above, the reach of analysis, or -the historiographical equivalent -as humanity's default state before the Enlightenment. Perhaps, as Ethan Shagan suggests, " 'taking belief seriously' precisely means that faith must be questioned, dissected, and analyzed, not because we decide that faith is a problematic category but because our subjects did." 7 As Steven Justice observes, it's precisely because belief is distinct from knowledge that it so often agitates the mind rather than settling it. This is why a state of belief that feels indistinguishable from the secure possession of knowledge was understood by many medieval writers as nothing less than a miracle, a kind of belief perhaps reserved for saints alone. Building on Justice's contention that medieval acts of belief internalize, and grapple with, "naturalizing or demystifying accounts" of faith typically associated with modernity, Albert Ascoli has gone so far as to argue that faith in the later Middle Ages and Renaissance was an ideology "not merely as we might define it from our own perspective," but as "the very name that early modernity itself gives to 'ideology,' or something very like it" -namely, the fabric of assumptions that "hold together a culture in an order at once coercive and enabling." 8 The statements of Shagan, Justice, and Ascoli serve very different purposes in very different arguments, but all express a common commitment to treating faith as a problem rather than as a given. Recognizing faith as an abiding problem entails recognizing the cognitive challenges it hosts and the fact that these challenges were not discovered yesterday.
As I have suggested, the assumption that faith was once unreflective, innocent of intellectual struggle, implies a static understanding of "traditional religion" based on an untenably stark opposition between affective and cognitive modalities (in which traditional devotion is imagined as a carrier for affect, not intellection, and the affective dimensions of modern intellectual practices are flattened or effaced altogether). A primary aim of this issue is to explore the mutual constitution of these modalities in particular acts of devotion and thought. Rather than offering a new account of the transition from traditional to modern society, or redescribing the Reformation's role in that process, or intervening in debates about what secularization is and how (or whether) it has occurred, the case studies gathered here invite us to reconsider the basic psychological categories that inflect these narratives, mediating (and often dulling) our perception of individual cases on the one hand and transhistorical continuities on the other.
In our eagerness to pay respectful attention to "traditional" forms of religiosity that involve forms of mental activity "not readily rendered in rational-propositional terms," we are in danger of overestimating how much any mental activity can be adequately rendered in such terms. 9 Even barebones logic, as used by humans, has an inescapably affective component, as instanced by the feeling of expectancy that clings to the word if. 10 Reciprocally, "affective piety" can be understood in cognitive terms, as a series of experiments in perception, understanding, and acknowledgment, engaging habits of thought as well as "structures of feeling" that have continued to develop in secular as well as religious contexts, informing "the life of the mind" in the largest sense. 11 Of course, the fact that varieties of religious experience are also varieties of intellectual experience does not mean that the reverse is the case. Still, Simone Weil's claim that, by virtue of its demands on the attention, "every school exercise . . . is like a sacrament" is a useful provocation to us, if only because it highlights the severely restricted affective vocabulary we use to describe intellectual engagements to which we have devoted our lives. 12 This brings me to the second term of the issue's title. Lately many scholars have been making intellectual labor an object of study; it is a choice that engages them, however obliquely, in the task of articulating the nature and value of their own work. As Jennifer Summit remarks of the recent boomlet of research on Renaissance humanism, such scholarship is always partly autobiography, and "it tends to intensify in moments of crisis or uncertainty in the academy." 13 If some of this scholarship suggests a threatened class combing the historical record for a defense of itself, taken as a whole this work suggests that the professoriat's appetite for self-criticism is at least as strong as its instinct for survival. The 2009 South Atlantic Quarterly special issue on intellectual labor, for example, featured several essays exploring the degeneration of critique under late capitalism into a "mock activity." 14 Perhaps in reaction to the "irrational exuberance" that attended the ascendance of theory in the Reagan years, contributors described the otiose character of many intellectual performances carried out in theory's name, suggesting that the institutional and economic frameworks currently sustaining theoretical reflection also constrain it. 15 Of course, this is a charge that critique commonly levels at itself: its complicity with the structures it thinks it is subverting. This accusation rings throughout the SAQ issue, as it does through academia (such indictments being the bread and butter of the professionally suspicious). But quite apart from the question of critique's efficacy is the term's adequacy to its presumed referent. For much of the twentieth century, accounts of the social value produced by intellectuals leaned hard on the term, and as Steven Goldsmith observes, we continue to depend on it to distinguish routine thought from the action by which thought calls into question "its previously unexamined categories . . . superseding concepts it had mistakenly assumed to be natural." 16 This denaturalizing, defamiliarizing activity has been associated not only with the interpretive disciplines but with the aesthetic function itself. 17 Even so, the dogged emphasis on critique in defenses of the humanities is a little wearing, partly because it feels disingenuous. Its pedagogical analogue -the idea that what humanities professors primarily teach is "critical thinking" -tasks us with explaining why a class in Renaissance poetry (for example) is more likely to produce critical thinkers than one in statistics or logic. 18 More fundamentally, it's not clear how relevant the cultivation of suspicion is to many of the things we do: attending closely to artifacts, exerting analytical pressure on words, speculating about possibilities, or testing those possibilities out. The so-called "revenge of the aesthetic," the "new formalism," and above all the renewed fascination with affect, to name only a few recent trends, all suggest the academy's manifest eagerness, at times verging on desperation, for alternative models of intellectual engagement. 19 Summit suggests that we have failed to provide a compelling rationale for our work because we locate its value in our objects of study rather than in the skills we master and teach -reading, writing, speaking, and, of course, critical thinking (unlike our Renaissance predecessors who under-stood their work as an ongoing dialectic between episteme and techne). Yet she also warns against assuming a "too-easy linkage" between the acquisition of these skills and the cultivation of character or wisdom (political or otherwise), and she is positively dismissive of traditional pieties about their relevance to questions about "what it means to be human," which she complains presume "a pre-existing 'human' quality" like "the human experience" or "human dignity." 20 Yet for Pico della Mirandola, man's dignity resided precisely in his plasticity; his oration is above all a performance of the principle that describing human dignity offers a means to construct it. This is why Summit's emphasis on practice -on the concrete activities through which we define our work and ourselves -feels so apt. Her actual description of these activities, however, is somewhat dispiriting. Her emphasis on technical expertise (for instance, "skilled methods" of reading such as "data-mining") seems to support a vision of higher education focused on the acquisition of abstractable, transposable skills in the "administered world." 21 An apologia for modern learning focused on practice might focus instead on the cultivation of affective dispositions and habits (resulting, for example, in attentive stamina in the presence of cherished artifacts), or on emotional experiments guided by authoritative texts, or on the heuristic uses of fantasy and identification. But we are more likely to encounter accounts of such experiences when reading about medieval nuns than in defenses of the modern humanities curriculum, even though such experiences are precisely what first drew many of us toward it. 22 The essays in this issue aim to illuminate territories of qualitative experience whose deceptive familiarity has left them underdescribed, and therefore undervalued. To focus on the cognitive challenges of devotional life and the quasi-devotional aspects of intellectual life (whether these aspects are understood in residual, emergent, or other terms altogether) is not simply a matter of exploring activities like praying, meditating, and even dreaming as varieties of intellectual labor alongside textual production and scientific inquiry, but of revealing their mutual constitution as well. To take an example relevant to several of the essays in this issue: for many early modern natural philosophers, the distinctions between the observation of nature, religious devotion, and affective training were indistinct, perhaps even nonexistent. To an extent that is almost hard to fathom today, scientists writing about their work also felt a responsibility to describe how it felt to do it. 23 And, as Mary Baine Campbell has shown, for all their talk of dominating Nature, Francis Bacon and his followers wrote with an intense awareness that the experience of discovery "interferes drastically with the sense of mastery that knowledge confers": this was not a problem but the point. The work of discovery depended on a relation to knowing that required "the suspension of mastery, certainty, knowingness itself," making it a continual object lesson in humility. 24 This stood to reason, since natural investigation was nothing more or less than a revival of the first religious service that man undertook in his innocence. As Peter Harrison argues in this issue, it was precisely because restoring the book of creation to legibility was an ongoing act of devotion that it was inseparable from the cultivation of virtue and pursuit of the good life.
It might be objected that while we are justified in describing early modern science (whatever its devotional and affective aspects) as a kind of intellectual labor, invoking the term in the context of intercessory prayer is grossly inappropriate. Far from describing a natural activity of the human mind (such an argument might go), intellectual labor is a concept that was scarcely imaginable before Bacon's "active philosophy." Bacon's term sounded oxymoronic to contemporary ears, and the oxymoron was tendentious, an announcement of the new philosophy's determination to erect itself on the ruins of the classical opposition of action and contemplation. Somewhat perversely (or so it seemed to many), Bacon identified experimental philosophy with consequential action by asserting its instrumental character, insisting on its roots in the banausic arts, the mundane realm of practice over which philosophy was traditionally elevated. In the following two centuries, however, intellectuals of all kinds -poets, pamphleteers, and journalists, as well as scientists -would strive to identify themselves with this ideal. Within the experimentalist vision they shared, to use the mind properly was to engage, and to feel oneself engaged, in a productive labor. 25 Later philosophers were less sanguine about this model of intellectual activity. Martin Heidegger suggested that the technological revolution that began in the seventeenth century had been so successful in elevating mere ingenuity over meditative thinking that "calculative thinking may someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking," and the opening pages of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment (in which Bacon appears as modernity's first prophet of instrumental reason) suggest that Heidegger's prediction has all but come to pass. 26 If the twentieth-century critique of Bacon was based in part on a selective reading of the sources, it also gained crucial support from Hannah Arendt's effort to reinstate the classical philosophical tradition's contempt for labor. As Timothy Brennan has argued, by insisting on the restoration of the distinction she claimed obtained in ancient Greece among the terms labor, work, and action, Arendt sought to dismantle the "recognition of material labor as the foundation of all value," along with the recognition of thought's debt to the physical labor that makes it possible. 27 But Arendt's stance is not intuitively irresistible, much less our only bulwark against the tyranny of instrumental reason. As Plato's own habit of turning to the trades to provide examples of rationally guided action makes plain, Bacon was not the first to recognize workers as thinkers and thinkers as workers. 28 The degrading constructions of "maker's knowledge" in the classical tradition are easily analyzed as the philosopher's defense against the threat posed by the artisan's ability to make knowledge productive, and, more fundamentally, by the evidentiary authority of sensuous experience itself, the basis of what Pamela Smith calls artisanal epistemology. The acknowledgments of the power of maker's knowledge that we find throughout classical myth suggest how much effort must have gone into upholding the pretense that genuine knowledge could, as Seneca put it, have nothing to do with tools or anything else involving a bent body and a mind gazing upon the ground. 29 The emergence of an experimentalist understanding of intellectual labor must be understood as part of a much longer story. Summit's emphasis on the centrality of techne to the humanist vision is helpful here. While Juan Luis Vives famously urged scholars not to be "ashamed to enter into shops and factories, and to ask questions from craftsmen, and to get to know about the details of their work," other humanist intellectuals described the details of their own work in terms that evoked not just hardy manual labor but the base drudgery of housework itself. Erasmus did not hesitate to compare his own scholarly labors to those of Hercules -labors that pose something of an embarrassment for Arendt, who acknowledges their heroic character but goes on to insist that the daily fight in which the human body is engaged to keep the world clean and prevent its decay bears little resemblance to heroic deeds; the endurance it needs to repair every day anew the waste of yesterday is not courage, and what makes the effort painful is not danger but its relentless repetition. 30 But as forthcoming work by Katie Kadue demonstrates, for Erasmus, the restoration of learning was a heroic task precisely because the work it entailed was endless, tedious, and poorly compensated. Although literary works had enduring public significance, they nonetheless stood "in need of continuous maintenance and repair" by learned interpreters willing to undertake what he called "the unpopular and unvarying toil of collecting, of sweeping together, explaining, and translating." What Kadue calls the "curation, cultivation, and strategic preservation of textual material" was an extension of the "compositional and recompositional labor characteristic of domestic life" -one of many practices linking the oikos to the state. Readers of John Milton's Areopagitica are often struck by the workmanlike physicality of his descriptions of reading, writing, thinking, and conversing, but, as Kadue suggests, the continual bleeding of the writer's study into the kitchen, the workshop, the garden, and the laboratory in Milton's text reflects a felt continuity. 31 Moving further back in history, Anne Middleton has argued that work replaced estate in fourteenth-century England as "the most fundamental term for the participation of individuals and groups in the totality of the human community." This concept of work was "erected on an agrarian base" and answerable to its criteria. The elevation of the worker as the national "good subject" necessarily led to the devaluation of otium: in place of "mutually supportive functional identities and 'ways of life' regulated by purportedly divine sanctions," all legitimate activity was now to be judged by the same standard; it had to deliver social value.
Hereafter the activities and privileges of literati will increasingly have to be justified in social theory in some version of the laity's political terms -as simply another form of "work" for the community's good, not as "louable" exception from, or obverse of, the laborious, as embodying the contemplative, speculative, or reflective "sabbath" of soul and society. 32 It is in this context that William Langland's protagonist Will elaborates a defense of his, and hence the poet's, enterprise as "real work" rather than idle fiction. But Will's self-portrait in Piers Plowman associates such work with religious observance as well. Like the agricultural labor that is never done, but also like a "lay liturgy," Will's clerical piecework, along with Langland's poem, is an ongoing labor demanding enough to organize a life and (in principle) powerful enough to serve and stabilize a community. 33 What Middleton describes as the "withdrawal of sanction" from otium was never complete, but it provides essential background for our understanding of the more widely documented struggle of the humanists with the category, of which the Baconian model of intellectual labor was in many ways the culmination. 34 The association of contemplative activity with leisure, then, was hardly untroubled or unquestioned before the Baconian challenge; the notion that contemplative pursuits could be productive and quasi-sacred work that promoted the common good was available long before Bacon was born. Indeed, Middleton's account of how need functioned in this social vision "as the primal condition of humanity in history, one whose claims can never be transcended or renounced in life on earth," serves equally well as a gloss on the thought of Saint Benedict, or for that matter Augustine. In this vision, "which renders the sustenance of human material and the social body paramount," labor is the central fact of human existence. 35 Of course, the practical implications of this vision for intellectual work, or any work, are far from clear. As David Aers has discussed at length, the vagrancy legislation that Middleton shows promoted the ideal of the good worker was directed squarely against working people: mobile workers searching for better wages. By describing migrant laborers as a "predatory class of wanderers" -"able-bodied beggars" pursuing an "idle life" -moralists were trying to leverage contemporary suspicions of religious poverty to create "an employer's utopia," in which laborers would be forced to accept whatever wages they were given. 36 All the more striking, then, that at the very moment one would expect an attack on the mendicant orders, a priest appears and forces the poem in a different direction. As Aers suggests, however, the poem's attachment to a social vision that can't be accommodated to contemporary circumstances leads again and again "to an imaginative withdrawal from the field of material production at the basis of all human spiritual life as of all human relations," leaving the poet as rootless and as stranded as the vagrants he rebukes. If this makes some of the key terms of the poem feel unmoored, it also leaves them open to creative appropriation by radical thinkers like John Ball. 37 The inconclusive experiment begun in Langland's visionary poemthe attempt to reimagine the relations of devotion, labor, and authorship -is extended in all directions in the early modern period, often under the very sign of experiment. From the rise of so-called "experimental religion" to what Debora Shuger calls the "spiritual empiricism" of the Little Gidding group to Anne de Gonzague's experiment with a fragment of the true cross, the various forms of experimentation explored in this volume forge affiliations not only between the spheres of activity Arendt segregates, but between the devotional and intellectual spheres and "the two cultures" themselves. 38 Steven Justice's essay focuses on the basic experiment that the humanities exist to make possible: the effort to think the thoughts of another. Justice focuses on a particular stumbling block that modern readers face when attempting to think their way into the intellectual responses of medieval writers: the readiness of these writers to call their opponents "shameless." It's a tendency that triggers a reflex of our own -that of imputing anxiety to our historical subjects (especially when they appear to us as embattled defenders of orthodoxy). Justice closely considers when the use of this gambit is justified, and when it isn't. In the process, he demonstrates that responsible intellectual engagement requires a kind of moral discipline. The failure to engage historically distant interlocutors as people whose "utterances deserve responses and not merely diagnoses" is not merely an intellectual failure but a failure of charity and indeed of civility. A feature of Justice's essay that makes it exemplary of the kind of engagement it advocates is its use of a rule of thumb derived from Augustine: when considering whether a statement about another person is justified, it is worth testing its coherence when put into the first person. Observing in ourselves a reluctance to undertake this sympathetic exercise can help us learn to recognize when we are working with our sources and when we are merely trifling with them. Joshua Phillips's essay explores the pressure that the dissolution of the monasteries put on "the question of what intellectual and spiritual labor might legitimately claim to do." Reversing Max Weber's claim that the "Reformation took rational Christian asceticism and its methodical habits out of the monasteries and placed them in the service of active life in the world," Phillips shows that in the generations following the dissolution, writers found in otia monastica a model for literary autonomy. Challenging the Baconian model of intellectual labor discussed above, Phillips postulates that in any highly organized society with a large degree of social specialization, the figure of "idleness" -of exception from the rule of production -serves an essential function. His far-ranging meditation on what reformers dismissed as the "lippe labour" of the monks finds a compelling figure for the work of literature, and perhaps of thought itself, in the practice of intercessory prayer: a means to sustain a relation to others in the face of their physical absence (or possible nonexistence).
Continuing Phillips's exploration of "the monastic impulse" in post-Reformation England, Debora Shuger's essay offers a glimpse into the everyday workings of the community at Little Gidding founded by Nicholas Ferrar. Shuger begins by observing that the Academy's mission statement -"to make a particular survey of those opinions and practices which the world recommends or disallows, weighing them not in the scales of common judgment but of true and right reason, according to the weights and by the standard of the Scripture" -was a Cartesian proposal, barring the last clause, although it was six years before the Discourse on Method was published. Starting with the conviction that "contemporary Europe was not a Christian culture in any meaningful sense," members of this community pursued a program of "spiritual empiricism" that included a striking degree of political experimentation. The way of life pursued at Little Gidding was literally an experiment, one unfolding in real time in response to emergent occasions.
Approaching the relationship between religion and the new philosophy from a different angle, Stephen Gaukroger's essay presents an argument that is almost the mirror image of his previous work. In The Emergence of a Scientific Culture: Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1210 -1685, Gaukroger explores how science harnessed, and then took over, the legitimating power of religion, gradually shaping all cognitive values around scientific ones. This essay, in contrast, explores how the self-image of Christianity as a body of true doctrine became the basis for a general model of understanding in the West, a model that shaped philosophy, and above all natural philosophy, in the seventeenth century. Gaukroger finds evidence for a feedback loop: as natural philosophy seeks to become more like Christianity -a canon of doctrines immune to further revision -Christianity itself becomes ever more "doctrinalized." Peter Harrison's essay also explores the disputed borderland between science and religion, but it does so on the grounds of a single word. As he shows, throughout the late sixteenth century and for most of the seventeenth century, the term experiment and its cognates occur more frequently in theological contexts than in natural philosophical ones. Paying close attention to the contexts in which these terms appear, Harrison reveals the emergence of particular oppositions, such as that between experiential knowledge on the one hand and speculative knowledge on the other: oppositions that would be taken up by promoters of the new philosophy. The fact that the putative virtues of the new philosophy were prefigured in theological writings helped to make the subsequent case not just for the respectability of an experimental natural philosophy, but for its role in fostering the virtuous life.
David Marno's essay traces shifts in meditative practice from Saint Ignatius of Loyola's Spiritual Exercises to the experimental philosopher Robert Boyle's Occasional Reflections, showing how Boyle's text participates in the evolution of the concept of attention as it shifts from a spiritual ideal to a mental faculty. Marno contends that in the Spiritual Exercises there is in fact no such thing as "attention," only "the act of attending and the experience of being attentive" -an experience that is "not independent of the spiritual ideal of attending to God but rather a sign and trace of the latter." Boyle sought to relax the strict regime of meditation by offering a new recipe: his reformed program of "occasional meditation" entails surrendering to attention's "natural vagrancy" rather than resisting it. Marno argues that by allowing experiences that would have formerly counted as distractions to be acts of devotional attention, Boyle participated in the creation of a new, psychological notion of attention. To read Boyle on attention is to witness a modern conviction in the making: that "distraction is a fundamental condition of modern life that must be redeemed and integrated into the practices of art, science, and politics." While Marno's essay deals with one of the most famous practitioners of the experimental philosophy, Jennifer Hillman focuses on a single experiment: Anne de Gonzague's trial with an incombustible piece of wood thought to be a fragment of the holy cross, which seems to have played a critical role in her conversion. A holy relic as well as a modern scientific "curiosity," this fragment was collected and "tested" as the latter, and by this means confirmed as the former. This is not a simple case of two opposing discourses converging on a single object. Far from offering a neat fable of modernization or secularization (traditional religion yielding to the new philosophy, the reliquary's supercession by the Wunderkammer), this episode demonstrates that religious orthodoxy could be reinforced by empiricism rather than merely accommodated to it.
Mary Baine Campbell's essay takes up the relationship between faith and physical exploration on different grounds, exploring how French missionaries negotiated interactions between the dreamworld and the New World. As she explains, it was during the age of exploration that the French word for dream, songe, was replaced by rêve, a term associated with wandering: this is fitting, since the first user of the word may have been Paul Le Jeune, the first major missionary ethnographer in New France. Campbell compares Le Jeune's disparaging descriptions of the role dreams played among the Algonquian Montagnais and Iroquois Huron nations with the writings of Marie Guyot (Marie de l'Incarnation), which record the prophetic dreams of Iroquois women with respect and evident belief. Campbell speculates that the continued existence of guides to dream symbolism attests to an abiding sense that dreams, or at least their meanings, are communal, but among the Algonquian and Iroquois they could also be collectively binding. In the New World, it was the work of dreams to produce a reality that could pass beyond "the boundaries of waking consciousness and the individual body": as Campbell suggests, this is the task of scholarly work as well.
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